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[8. F. No. 17224. In Bank. Dec. 9, 1947.] 
B. G. JOHNSTON, Respondent, v. BOARD OF' SUPERVI-
SORS OF MARIN COUNTY et aI., Defendants and 
Appellants; VITO B. ALIOTO, Intervener and Appel-
lant. 
[1] Appeal-Review-Questions Reviewable.-The objections that 
there is a misjoinder of causes of action and a failure to state-
alleged causes of action separately, when not relied upon on 
appeal, may be regarded as waived. 
[2] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Legislative Acts.-A tem-
porary injunction restraining a board of supervisors from 
either publishing a local zoning ordinance or taking any steps 
to bring such ordinance into effect interferes with the legis-
lative action of such board, and is improper regardless of 
whether its action would be valid. 
[3] Id.-Matters Controllable-Legislative Acts.-Assuming that 
the contemplated action of a board of supervisors in effectu-
ating a local zoning ordinance would be in excess of its juris-
diction, any authority that a court might have to enjoin such 
action is qualified by the requirement that plaintiff show that < 
there is no other adequate remedy for the protection of his ' 
rights and that political rights would not be curtailed. Before 
an injunction would be available in such case it would at least 
be necessary for plaintiff to show that the passage of the 
[2] Injunction against legislative body of state or municipality, 
note, 140 A.L.R. 439. Sec, also, 14 Cal.Jur. 202; 28 Am.Jur. 366. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Arrcn] and Error, ~ 97(L [2, 3) In-
junctions, § 19(1); [4-6, 8-11) Zonillg; [7] Statutes, § 180. 
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ordinance, without any attempt to enforce it, would instantly 
produce irreparable injury. 
[4] Zoning-Ordinances-Variances.-The power to authorize a 
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance may be granted 
to an ndministrative board without violating the principle 
IIgainst the delegation of legislative powers. 
[5J ld.-Powers of Legislative Body.-A board of supervisors has 
no inherent power to grant a use permit, regardless of the 
terms of a local zoning ordinance. 
[6J ld.-Powers of Legislative Body.-When a board of super-
visors acts in an administrative capacity, as in granting per-
mits under a zoning ordinance, it is bound by the terms of the 
oroinonce until it is amended through proper legislative pro-
cedure. 
[7J Sta tutes-Construction-Contemporaneo1!s Construction.-The 
rule of contemporaneous construction may not be applied when 
the wording of the statute or ordinance clearly calls for a dif-
ferent construction. 
IS] Zoning-Powers of Legislative Body.-A board of supervisors 
cannot under Const., art. XI, § 11, adopt a zoning ordinance 
conflicting with state legislation on the subject. 
[9J ld.-Construction of Zoning Laws.-The State Planning Act 
(Stats. ]929, p. 1805, as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
5211b) does not require a board of supervisors to reserve to 
itself authority to grant a use permit, such as one to construct 
and operate a fish cannery and reduction plant, regardless of 
the decision of the local planning commission. 
[10] ld.-Construction of Zoning Laws.-The State Planning Act, 
§ 10, providing the procedure to be followed in certain matters 
when final authority thereon is within the jurisdiction of some 
body other than the planning commission, applies to action 
taken by any local public body or officer, and applies to a 
board of supervisors only if that body is the one having final 
authority over the matter involved. 
[l1J Id.-Remedies-Injunction.-A temporary injunction may is-
sue to enjoin a board of supervisors from issuing a use permit 
in violation of a zoning ordinance where the permit has been 
denied by the planning commission in the exercise of its law-
ful authority, and this is true notwithstanding the fact that 
the allegations of the complaint with respect to the offensive 
nature of a proposed fish reduction plant may also be con-
strued as allegations of a nuisance. 
[4) Constitutionality of provisions of zoning statutes or ordi-
nances authorizing the granting of variances, note, 86 A.L.R. 714. 
See, also, 12 Cal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. 139. 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Marin 
County granting an injunction pendente lite. Edward I., 
Butler, JUdge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
A. E. Bagshaw, District Attorney, Harold Jos. Haley, 
Deputy District Attorney, and Natalie J. Holly for Defen-
dants and Appellants. 
George Olshausen for Intervener and Appellant. 
Paul S. Marrin, Howard C. Ellis and Sterling Carr for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-This action was brought by a resident and 
taxpayer of Marin County to restrain the members of the 
board of supervisors of that county from issuing to the 
Benicia Food Products Company n use permit to construct 
and operate a fish cannery and reduction plant within an 
unincorporated part of the county. The plaintiff also sought 
an injunction against the members of the board to restrain 
them from adopting an ordinance that allegedly authorized 
the construction and maintenance of the proposed plant in 
this area. Defendants, the members -of-the"-OO81'd-uf -sup -
visors, and interveners, Benicia Food Products Company, and, 
Vito B. Alioto, appeal from an order pendente lite enjoining 
the issuance of the use permit and the enactment of the 
ordinance. 
The injunction was issued on the basis of plaintiff 's com~ 
plaint, the substance of which follows. The Benicia Food 
Products Company filed an application with the Marin County 
Planning Commission for a permit to construct and operate 
a fish cannery and reduction plant in an unincorporated 
part of Marin County, located about one mile from plaintiff's 
residence. Plaintiff alleges that the operation of the pro-, 
posed plant in that area would pollute the air with offensive' 
odors and contaminate the waters surrounding plaintiff'. 
property. Although the proposed site for the plant is in an, 
area zoned for heavy industry, the local zoning ordinance: 
(Ordinance 264 of Marin County) provides that a use permit' 
must be obtained before any :fish reduction plant may be 
constructed or operated in such area. 
The commission held a hearing on the application for a 
use permit, and Mrs. Natalie Holly, wife of R. A. Thompson,' 
a member of the Marin County Board of Supervisors, appeared 
) 
) 
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as attorney for the applicant. After the hearing, the commis-
sion voted to deny the application and transmitted its report 
to the board of supervisors. The report was considered by 
the board of supervisorS at a public meeting, at which Mrs. 
Holly again represented the applicant. At this meeting, Super-
visor Thompson submitted a proposed ordinance entitled, 
"An ordinance ... regulating the establishment, maintenance 
and operation of reduction plants ... and repealing all con-
flicting ordinances and parts of ordinances." Without sub-
mitting the proposed ordinance to the Marin County Plan-
ning Commission, the board then voted to adopt it by a vote 
of three to two. Supervisor Thompson then made a motion 
that the board reject the report of the planning commission 
and grant the application of the Benicia Food Products Com-
pany for a use permit. This motion was likewise carried by 
a vote of three to two. A supervisor voting against the pro-
posed ordinance and against the use permit gave notice im-
mediately after the vote on each measure that under parlia-
mentary rules of order he elected to change his vote, and 
made motions for reconsideration of each matter at the next 
meeting. 
Plainti1f filed the complaint before the next scheduled 
meeting of the board of suMrvisors, and the trial court 
issued a temporary restraining order and an order to show 
cause why an injunction pendente lite should not be issued. 
The ground on which plaintiff sought an injunction against 
enactment of the proposed ordinance was that the ordinance 
would be invalid because it was not submitted to the plan-
ning commission for a report as required by the provisions 
of the State Planning Act (Stats. 1929, p. 1811, § 9, as 
amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 5211b) and sec-
tion 21, Ordinance 264 of Marin County. The injunction 
restraining the board of supervisors from issuing the use 
permit was sought on two grounds: (1) that under the provi-
sions of ordinance 264, such a permit could be granted only 
on affirmative action of both the planning commission and 
the board of supervisors; and (2) that Supervisor Thompson 
was disqualified from participating in any action that the 
board of supervisors might take with respect to the appli-
cation for a use permit. 
The Benicia Food Products Company and Vito B. Alioto, 
a part owner of the company, were joined as defendants 
along with the members of the board of supervisors. The 
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company, Alioto, and Supervisor Thompson, jointly filed 8 
demurrer and an answer. The grounds of the demurrer 
were that the complaint failed to state facts constituting Ii 
cause of action; that the complaint contained a misjoinder 
of two causes of action; and that two causes of action were 
not separately stated. The other members of the board of 
supervisors filed a general demurrer. The trial court dis-
missed the action as to the Benicia Food Products Company 
and Alioto and granted them leave to appear as interveners. 
They thereupon rested their opposition to the injunction on 
the demurrer and answer previously filed. The demurrers 
were overruled, and after hearing on the order to show cause, 
the trial court issued an injunction pendente lite restraining 
the members of the board of supervisors "from (a) issuing 
or causing to be issued any Use Permit, or any permit, pur-
suant to the application of said Benicia Food Products Com-
pany, filed as set forth in the complaint on file nprein before 
the Planning ComInission of the said County of Marin ... , 
and (2) from publishing said purported Ordinance likewise 
referred to in said complaint on file herein, or taking any 
steps to bring said Ordinance into existence or effect. . .. " 
Defendants and interveners, hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as defendants, have appealed from this order on 
the following grounds: (1) the injunction is erroneous in 
that it restrains the board of supervisors from taking legis-
lative action; (2) the board of supervisors had power to 
issue the use permit in question after the denial thereof by 
the planning commission; (3) Supervisor Thompson was not 
disqualified from participating in any action with respect 
to the issuance of the use permit; (4) the injunction is ex-
cessive in any event, because it enjoins the construction of a 
fish cannery as a nuisance. [1] Defendants on appeal have 
not relied on the alleged misjoinder of causes of action or 
failure to state two alleged causes of action separately. Those 
contentions may therefore be regarded as waived. (Title 
O. & T. Co. v. Fraternal Finance Co., 220 Cal. 362, 363 
f30 P.2d 515] ; Mayne v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 179 Cal. 
173, 179 [175 P. 690].) In any event, if the complaint is 
deficient in these respects, there is nothing to indicate that 
defendants were in any way prejudiced thereby. (Cal. Const., 
art VI, § 4th; Tobin Grocery Co. v. l'f'Pry, 204 Cal. 247. 250 
[267 P. 694] ; cases collected 2 Cal.Jur. 1010, § 601.) 
[2] The contention that the injunction erroneously re-
strains legislative action by the board of supervisors is meri-
.1 
Dec. 1947] JOHN"STON 'V. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
(31 C.2d 66: 187 P.2d 686] 
71 
torious. The temporary restraining order was issued after 
action on the proposed ordinance was delayed by the motion 
for reconsiueration. The temporary injunction pendente lite, 
by ordering the board of superyisors to refrain from either 
publishing the ordinance or taking any steps to bring such 
ordiuance into effect, clearly interfered with the legislative 
action of the legislative body of the county. Regardless of 
whether the action of the board of supervisors would be 
valid, such an injunction is not the proper remedy in this case. 
[3] Plaintiff contends that there is an exception to the 
general rule or judicial noninterference with the legislative 
action of a county board of supervisors (Nickersen v. San 
Bernardino Oounty, 179 Cal. 518, 522 [177 P. 465]; cases 
collected 140 A.L.R. 439, 440) when the board is about to 
adopt an ordinance in excess of its jurisdiction. (See Glide 
v. Superior Oourt, 147 Cal. 21, 23 [81 P. 225].) Even if it 
be assumed that the contemplated action would be in excess 
of the board's jurisdiction in this case, any authority that 
a court might have to enjoin such action is qualified by the 
requirement that plaintiff show that there is no other ade-
quate remedy for the protection of his rights and that politi-
cal rights would not be curtailed. (See Harnett v. Oounty 
of Sacramento, 195 Cal. 676, 683 [235 P. 445].) Before an 
iujul1ction would be available to restrain legislative action 
il; this case it would at least be necessary for plaintiff to 
!Show that the passage of the ordinance without "any at-
tempt to enforce it would instantly produce irreparable 
injury." (6 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 731.) Obvi-
ously, plaintiff cannot make such a showing, for if the ordi-
nance is illegally enacted, he will have an adequate remedy 
in his right to seek an injunction restraining its enforcement 
or restraining anyone from building or operating a fish re-
duction plant pursuant to it. 
The principal issue with respect to the validity of the 
remainder of the injunction is whether the board of super-
visors under Ordinance 264 of Marin County and under the 
State Planning Act may issue a use permit after the Marin 
County Planning Commission had denied an application 
therefor. 
The property in question was located in a district desig-
nated as an "M-2" or heavY industry zone by the master 
plan of Marin County. Section 11.19 of the ordinance in 
question provides that property in "M-2" zones may be used 
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for •• All uses not otherwise prohibited by law j provided how-
ever, that none of the following uses shall be established in 
any 'M-2' district unless and until a use permit in each case 
shall first have been secured for such use: . . . Reduction, 
canning, processing or treatment of fish or of animal products 
of any kind." 
Section 20 of the ordinance provides that use permits may 
be issued for "Any of the uses or purposes for which such 
permits are required or permitted by the provisions of this 
ordinance. " This section also provides that, "Such permits 
shall be issued under the same procedure as that specified 
in Section 19 of this ordinance for the granting of adjust-
ments or variances . . . I, with certain exceptions relating to 
the conduct of hearings by the commission. Section 19 thus 
contains the procedural provisions applicable to the grant-
ing of use permits under section 11.19 of the ordinance. 
The first sentence of section 19 concerns the powers of 
the board of supervisors and of the commission with respect 
to adjustments and variances. The power to grant adjust-
ments and variances, within strictly defined limits, is given 
to the commission in the following . terms: "The Planning 
Commission, subject to tke approval and confirmation of the 
Board of Supervisors m-each-case~- as hereInafter provlded,-
skall kave tke power to grant adjustments and variances in 
any of the provisions of the ordinance. . .. " (Italics added.) 
This is not a procedural provision and therefore is not in-
corporated by reference into section 20. It should be noted, 
however, that the sentence vests "the power to grant adjust-
ments and variances" in the commission, subject to the ap-
proval and confirmation of the board of supervisors, and does 
not reserve any authority in the board of supervisors to 
grant adjustments and variances. 
The pertinent procedural provisions of section 19 are 88 
follows: 
"Application for any adjustment or variance permissible 
under the provisions of this section shall be made to the 
Planning Commission in the form of a written application for 
a building permit or for a permit to use the property or 
premises as set forth in said application." 
"The Commission shall make its decision on the said ap-
plication and shall report such decision to the Board of 
Supervisors. ' , . 
" No permit skall be issued under the provisions of this 
.. 1 
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section unless and until a decision of the Planning Commis-
sion, as aforesaid, approving the same, is approved and con-
firmed by the Board of Supervisors . ... Upon receipts of 
such report, if the decision of the Planning Commission 
approved the granting of the application, the Board of Su-
pervisors either shall, by resolution, approve and confirm said 
decision, whereupon the permit as applied for may issue; or 
shall refuse to approve and confirm said decision." (Italics 
added.) 
Section 19 thus expressly provides that no permit shall be 
granted without the approval of the planning commission. 
The board of supervisors is given power merely to approve 
or refuse to approve the decision of the commission approving 
the application for a permit; the board of supervisors is 
given no authority over the application should the commis-
sion deny it. Since the only procedure for granting use 
permits is that specified in section 19 for variances and 
adjustments, it follows that the board of supervisors was not 
authorized by the ordinance to take affirmative action on the 
application for a use permit in the face of the disapproval 
thereof by the planning commission. 
[4] It is contended, however, that the board of super-
visors has inherent power to grant a ¥Se permit, and that 
any attempt to confer this power on the planning commis-
sion would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power to a local administrative board. The general rule, 
however, is that even the broader power to authorize a 
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance may be 
granted to an administrative board without violating the 
principle against the delegation of legislative powers. 
(Freeman v. Board of Adjustment,97 Mont. 342, 354 [34 
P.2d 534]; State v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 1242 [133 
So. 114] ; L. &: M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 
18 [180 N.E. 379, 86 A.L.R. 707] McCord v. Ed Bond &: 
Condon Co., 175 Ga. 667 [165 S.E. 590, 591, 86 A.L.R. 
703]; cases collected 86 A.L.R. 714.) The action of the 
planning commission in denying a use permit is wholly ad-
ministrative. There is no more delegation of legislative au-
thority in this case than is normally involved in vesting 
administrative officers with authority to grant or deny a 
permit pursuant to a local ordinance. (See Gaylord v. 
City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 436 [166 P. 348]; Gould 
v. Western Dairy Products, Inc., 12 Cal.App.2d 188, 191 
/ 
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[55 P.2d 274]; see, also, Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 
Ca1.2d 119, 124 [104 P.2d 1041].) 
[6] The board of supervisors, moreover, had no inherent 
power to grant the use permit regardless of the terms of the 
ordinance. It has long been recognized in this state that a 
county board of supervisors performs administrative as 
well as legislative functions. (Chinn v. Superior Court, 156 
Cal. 478, 481 [105 P. 580].) If the board of supervisors 
had power to grant a use permit, it was an administrative 
power for the same reason that the granting of permits 
is administrative when done by a local board. [6] When 
a board of supervisors acts in an administrative capacity, 
as in granting permits under a zoning ordinance, it is bound 
by the terms of the ordinance until the ordinance is amended 
through proper legislative procedure. (See Magruder v.' 
City of Redwood, 203 Cal. 665, 675 [265 P. 806) ; Hopkins 
v. MacCulloch, 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 452 [95 P.2d 950).) 
The action of the Marin County Board of Supervisors in 
attempting to grant a use permit contrary to the terms of 
the ordinance cannot be considered an amendment to the 
ordinance, for by its terms and by the terms of the State 
Planning Act under which it was adopted, any amendments 
to the master plan must be submitted to the local planning-
commission. (Ordinance 264, § 21; State Planning Act, § 9.) 
[7] Defendants invoke the rule of contemporaneous and 
practical construction of the ordinance to support their con-
tention that the ordinance authorizes the board of supervisors 
to issue a use permit after the planning commission has 
determined that it should be denied. In 1940, over two 
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the board granted 
an application for an adjustment after the commission had 
denied the application. In 1944, some six years after the 
enactment of the ordinance, the board granted an appli-
cation for a use permit despite the commission's denial of 
the application. In neither instance was the action of the 
board of supervisors "made at or near the time of the 
enactment" of the ordinance. (See 3 Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, p. 515.) Moreover, although contempo-
raneous construction by officials charged with the adminis-
tration of a statute or ordinance is given great weight, "final 
responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the 
courts. 'At most administrative practice is a weight in the 
seale, to be considered but not to be inevitably followed.' " 
/ 
f 
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(Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 753, 
756·757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405], quoting from 
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. 2d 973.) The 
rule of contemporaneous construction may not be applied 
when the wording of the statute or ordinance, as in the 
present case, clearly calls for a different construction. 
(California Drive·in Restaurant Ass'n. v. CZark, 22 Cal. 
2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].) 
IS] Defendants also contend that under the State 
Planning Act, the Board of Supervisors of Marin County 
had no authority thus to limit its powers over use permits. 
It is conceded that the board of supervisors had no authority 
to pass an ordinance inconsistent with the State Planning 
Act. Whether or not the board might have had authority 
pursuant to article XI, section 11, of the California Con-
stitution to provide for some form of zoning plan in the 
absence of a state statute on the subject of county zoning 
(see Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 Ca1.2d 384, 391 
[60 P.2d 847]; Wertheimer, Constitutionality of Rural 
Zoning, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 175, 177), the county board of su-
pervisors could not under this constitutional provision adopt 
a zoning ordinance con1licting with state legislation on the 
subject. [9] The question arises, therefore, whether the 
State Planning 'Act required a board of supervisors to re-
serve to itself authority to grant a use permit of the type 
involved in this case regardless of the decision of the local 
planning commission. 
Section 6.3 of the State Planning Act authorizes the legis-
lative body of a county, in adopting a master plan or part 
thereof, II to determine upon reasonable and practical means 
for putting into effect such master plan or part thereof, in 
order that the same will serve as a pattern and guide for 
the orderly physical growth and development of such . . • 
county and as a basis for the efficient expenditure of the 
funds thereof relating to the subjects of such master plan. 
Such legislative body may adopt and use such procedure as 
may be necessary for, this purpose." (Italics added.) This 
section clearly authorizes a county board of supervisors to 
provide in the county' zoning orllinancc for reasonable and 
practical means for putting the master plan into effect. 
The ordinance in question provicles that fish reduction plants 
lIlay be constructed and operated in "M·2" zones only when 
& USe permit therefor is obtained on the approval of an appli-
./ 
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cation for such a permit by both the planning commISSIon 
and the board of supervisors. It could have provided that 
there should be no fish reduction plants in "M-2" zones j 
instead, it provides for such plants, if. a proper permit is 
obtained. It could have provided that the board of super-
visors was free to grant such permits j instead, it requires 
approval of both the planning commission and the board 
of supervisors for the construction of any fish reduction 
plant in "M-2" zones. 
Section 20 of the ordinance indicates that this limitation was 
adopted to prevent the issuance of use permits that might 
"under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimen-
tal to the health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, or wel-
fare of persons residing or working in the neighborhood of 
such use. . . ." The requirement of affirmative action by both 
bodies is certainly a reasonable and practical means of accom-
plishing this purpose and putting the master plan into effect 
under section 6.3 of the State Planning Act. (See, also, § 8 
of the State Planning Act.) 
The procedure set forth in the ordinance is designed to pro-
tect interested citizens and property owners. The require-
ment that the board of supervisors follow this procedure can-
'not'bemsregifrdedoiCthe--ground' that 'the- board can modify 
the procedure by amending the ordinance. The State Planning 
Act prescribes' a definite procedure for amending the local-
planning ordinance. It provides for public hearings before the' 
local planning commission before adoption of the ordinance 
and before any amendments may be made to the ordinance 
after its adoption, as a means of protecting interested citizens 
and property owners. Before any ordinance is adopted, the 
local planning commission must hold public hearings at which 
interested parties may appear. (State Planning Act, § 5.) A 
proposed plan is then submitted to the local legislative body, 
which also holds public hearings. Any change in the proposed 
ordinance must be submitted to the commission for additional 
public hearings. (Ibid. § 6.) 
The board of supervisors does not now have unlimited 
powu to make any change in the ordinance. Substantially 
the same procedure used in adopting the ordinance must be 
followed in making changes. The board has no power to make ' 
changes until it has submitted them to the commission for . 
public hearings, where interested parties may appear and . 
present arguments in opposition thereto. (Ibid. § 9.) If the 
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board of supervisors, in an administrative capacity, can ignore 
the clear provisions of the ordinance, it was idle to prescribe 
th(> procedure for amendments. 
[10] Defendants contend that the Legislature has pro-
vided a specific procedure in section 10 of the state act for the 
issuance of use permits and that the ordinance in question is 
inconsistent with that section, which provides: "The body 
creating such planning commission may, by general or special 
rule, provide for the reference of any other matter or class 
of matters to the planning commission before final' action 
thereon by the public body or officer of said city, county, or 
eity and county, having final authority thereon, with the pro-
vision that final action shall not be taken until said planning 
commission has submitted its report thereon or has had reason-
able time, to be fixed in said rule, to submit the report. The 
planning commission shall have full power and authority to 
make such ijlvestigations, maps and reports, and recommenda-
tions in connection therewith relating to the planning and 
development of the city, county, or city and county, as it 
deems desirable, providing the total expenditures of said board 
shall not exceed the funds available therefor." (Italics 
added.) 
There is nothing in this section that requires the body creat-
ing the planning commission to reserve to itself final authority 
over such matters as the use permit involved in this case. 
It provides the procedure to be followed in certain matters 
when final authority thereon is within the jurisdiction of some 
body other than the planning commission. The parties dis-
agree as to what matters are referred to by the phrase" Other 
matters or class of matters." Defendants contend that it 
refers to any action with respect to local zoning other than 
amendments to the master plan provided for in the preceding 
section (§ 9). Plaintiff, on the other hand, construes the 
phrase as referring to matters affecting zoning that are not 
otherwise covered in the entire act. Under the latter construc-
tion, section 10 would be applicable if a local officer or board 
had final jurisdiction over some matter "relating to the plan-
ning and development of the . . . county" that was not an 
integral part of the zoning plan. It would authorize the 
local legislative body to require such officer or board to refer 
the matter to the planning commission before taking action. 
The last sentence in section 10 lends weight to this construc-
tion, for if section 10 refers to the administration of the basic 
:) 
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zoning plan itself, it was unnecessary for tIle Legislature to 
provide in this section that the "commission shall have full 
power and authority to make such investigations, maps and 
reports, and recommendations in connection therewith relat-
ing to the planning and development of the city, county, or 
city and county, as it deems desirable .... " Such powers 
are conferred on the commission by section 8 in connection 
with its duties in "carrying out" the master plan: "The 
commission, and its members, officers and employees in the 
performance of their functions, may enter upon any land and 
make examinations and surveys. . . . In general the commiS-
sion shall have such power as may be necessary to enable it to 
fulfill its functions and carry out the purposes of this act." 
Even if it be assumed, however, that defendants' construc-
tion is correct, section 10 would not apply to the use permit 
involved in this case. By its terms, the section applies only if 
final authority over the action referred to is given to some 
body or officer. There is no provision of either state or local 
law giving final authority over such use permits to the board 
of supervisors when the planning commission has decided 
against their issuance. Section 10 does not state that the body 
creating the commission must provide. for reference to the 
planning commission of any matter involving the administra: 
tion of county zoning before final action thereon is taken by 
the body creating the planning commission. In order to read 
the section as if it contained such a provision it would be 
necessary to ignore the words "public body or officer . . • 
having final authority thereon." The section obviously ap-
plies to action taken by any local public body or officer, and 
it applies to a board of supervisors only if that body is the 
one having final authority over the matter involved. More-
over, it is circular reasoning to conclude that this section gives 
final authority over any matter to any officer or board, for 
until the question of the final authority of that body is deter-
mined, the question of the applicabiliy of section 10 remains 
undetermined. 
Defendants rely on a dictum in Hopkins v. MacCuZZoch, 35 
Cal.App.2d 442, 450 [95 P.2d 950], involving the effect of: 
section 10 on the power of a planning commission over non-· 
conforming use permits: "From an interpretation of .... 
section 10, supra, when construed with the ordinance adopted 
pursuant thereof, it appears to us that the planning commis-
sion created 0'11 the ordinance was more or less an advisory 
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body .... " (Italics added.) The permit involved in that case 
was of the nonconforming type under which a property owner 
might be allowed to continue a use prohibited by the master 
plan, a different type of permit from that involved in the 
present case. The ordinance there involved reserved to the 
city council the power to grant a nonconforming use perm.it 
by unanimous vote when the planning commission decided 
against the applicant. Since final authority was thus ex-
pressly given the city council, the reference to section 10 of 
the State Planning Act was unnecessary. Whether or not 
this dictum that a nonconforming use permit is "other mat-
ter or class of matters" within the meaning of section 10 is 
correct, the section has no application to a provision for use 
permits adopted as a method of administering the zoning plan, 
when there is no provision giving final authority over such 
permits to some local body or officer. Not only is no provision 
of the State Planning Act inconsistent with section 19 of the 
ordinance in question, but authority for that section is con-
tained in section 6.3 of the state act. 
The second ground on which the injunction was sought is 
that the action of the board of supervisors, even if authorized 
by law is invalid because -of the disqualification of a member 
who cast the deciding vo'te. Since the board in any event was 
without authority to grant the use permit, it is unnecessary to 
decide whether the supervisor in question was disqualified. 
[11] Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the operation 
of the proposed plant wou1d be offensive and would interfere 
with the proper use of his property. Defendants contE'nd 
that the injunction is excessive on the ground tha.t these al-
legations were designed to show a basis for injunctive relicf 
regardless of whether or not the interveners obtained a valid 
use permit. It is contended that the trial court enjoined the 
operation of the plant on the ground that it would be a 
nuisance even if authorized under the zoning regulations. 
Although plaintiff has argued on appeal that such relief 
would be proper, there is nothing in the injunction to indi-
cate that the trial court based its order on this ground. Even 
if the allegations with respect to the offensive nature of the 
proposed plant can be construed as allegations of a nuisance, 
they also form the basis of plaintiff's right to injunctive 
relief against the board of supervisors to prevent the issuance 
of a use permit contrary to the terms of the ordinance. The 
interveners were dismissed as defendants and appear only as 
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interveners. There is, therefore, no basis for the contention 
that they were enjoined from operating the proposed plant 
under a valid permit, for they are not directly enjoined from 
doing anything. Since the board of supervisors could not 
legally grant interveners application for a use permit, it is 
immaterial whether or not the interveners could be enjoined 
from operating under a valid permit. (For a collection of 
conflicting authorities on this question see note 166 A.L.R. 
659; see, also, Civ. Code, § 3482; Norton v. City of Pomona. 
5 Ca1.2d 54, 60 [53 P .2d 952).) 
The order granting the injunction pendente lite is affirmed 
insofar as it restrains the members of the Board of Supervisors 
of Marin County from attempting to grant a use permit after 
nf'gative action by the Marin County Planning Commission. 
That part of the order purporting to restrain the members of 
the board of supervisors from taking any action to amend the 
local zoning ordinance is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent from all of the judgment of this 
court except insofar as it reverses that part of the trial court'8 
order which purports to restrain the members of the board of 
supervisors from proceeding with the enactment of a regula-
tory ordinance governing the construction and operation of 
reduction plants. 
The chief question presented for decision is whether under 
the provisions of the State Planning Act (2 Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 5211b) and of Marin County Ordinance No. 264 
the Board of Supervisors of Marin County may grant a use 
permit despite an adverse recommendation of the county 
planning commission. For reasons hereinafter stated, I am of 
the opinion that :final authority in such matters rests in the 
board, that the recommendation of the planning commission 
is advisory only, and that the order of the trial court based 
upon a contrary view should be reversed in its entirety. 
The majority opinion rests largely, if not completely, as 
to this phase of the case upon the declaration that "Section 
19 [of Marin County Ordinance 264) thus expressly provides 
that no permit shall be granted without the approval of the 
planning commission. The board of supervisors is given 
power merely to approve or refuse to approve the decision of 
the commission approving the application for a permit; the 
) 
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board of supervisors is given no authority over the applica-
tion should the commission deny it." Having asserted such 
significance for section 19 of the ordinance, the opinion pro-
ceeds to interpret other sections thereof in the "light" of 
unquestioning acceptance of, and dependence on, its primary 
assertion. If that basic pronouncement falls, so does the whole 
discussion. 
The obvious vice in the above quoted pronouncement lies 
in the fact that section 19, read in its context, does not even 
purport to deal with powers of the board of supervisors; it 
deals expressly with powers of the planning commission. 
Ordinance 264, enacted by the board of supervisors, was not 
enacted to create a board of supervisors or to define the powers 
of the creating board; it was enacted to create a planning com-
mission and to define the powers of such commission. Mani-
festly, such ordinance is not intended to constitute a grant 
of power to the creating board; rather is it a delegation by the 
creating board of certain powers within its authority. A 
delegation of authority by a superior to an inferior does not 
work a complete divestment of the power of the superior; the 
power of the inferior derives from the superior and the lat-
ter is the final repository of all the power, with the right to 
exercise the same, except as such right may be limited by its 
own acts., The ordinance does provide for a planning com-
mission j it does specify the powers delegated to that commis-
sion j and it does declare limitations on the authority of the 
commission it creates; but nowhere does it declare that the 
power of the commission is total or absolute or exclusive or 
other than advisory; nowhere does it declare that the board 
of supervisors abdicates, or transfers to the commiRsion, the 
ultimate power of decision. The language most strongly 
relied upon by the majority is (§ 19): "No permit shall be 
issued under the provisions of this section [Le., by the plan-
ning commission] unless and until a decision of the Planning 
Commission, as aforesaid, approving the same, is approved 
and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors." (Italics added.) 
This stated limitation of power seems to me to be clearly a 
limitation upon the commission, not upon its creator, the 
board of supervisors. It appears to me to be reasonably 
designed to preclude, not to establish basis for, a construction 
of the law vesting a totality of power in the commission. 
Theories of absolutism in administrative agencies are not 
favored in traditional concepts of our ideology and should 
) 
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not be invoked by judicial interpolation. (See Roscoe Pound, 
"Annual Survey of Law: Decisions of Courts Show Some 
Dangerous Trends" (Nov. 1947), 33 Am. Bar Ass'n. Journal 
1093.) That it is only by dint of such interpolation that the . 
conclusion of the majority can be reached becomes evident 
upon consideration of the ordinance as a whole. 
Ordinance No. 264 was adopted in 1938, pursuant to the 
mandatory provisions of the State Planning Act as amended 
in 1937 (Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5211b), and sets up a com-
prehensive zoning system for the county covering all ter-
ritory therein outside of incorporated cities and towns. By 
its provisions, the county is zoned into various districts, in-
cluding residential, commercial, and light and heavy indus-
trial, and the uses to which the land lying within the respec-
tive districts may be put are specified. Procedures are also 
set forth for the application for and granting of adjustments 
or variances, and of use permits for the operation of various 
types of businesses in certain districts. 
By section 11.18 of Ordinance 264 district "M-1," in which 
petitioner seeks to establish a iish cannery and reduction 
plant, is zoned for "1. Commercial excavating . . . 2. All 
other uses not otherwise_prohiJlited_ Qy_l~w .. _except.the follow-_ 
ing: . . . reduction, canning, processing or treatment of fish 
or animal products of any kind . . ." Section 19, whicb_ 
deals with adjustments, variances, and appeals, provides that 
,. The Planning Commission, subject to the approval and con-
firmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case, as here-
inafter provided, shall have power to grant adjustments and 
variances in any of the provisions of this ordinance to the 
extent of the following and no further: . . . 
"Application for any adjustment or variance ... shall be 
made to the Planning Commission in the form of a written 
application . . . 
"[Following a public hearing] The Commission shall 
make its decision on the said application and shall report such 
decision to the Board of Supervisors. 
"In granting any adjustment or variance under the pro-
visions of this section, the Planning Commission shall desig-
nate such conditions in connection therewith as will, in its 
opinion, secure substantially the objectives of the regulation 
or provision to which such adjustment or variance is granted, 
as io light, air, and the public health, safety, comfort, con-
venience and general welfare. No permit shall be issued un-
) 
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der the provisl:ons of this section 'Unless and until a decision 
of the Planning Commission, as aforesaid, approving the 
same, is approved and confirmed by the Board of Super-
visors . ... Upon receipt of such report, if the decision of 
the Planning Commission approved the granting of the ap-
plication, the Board of Supervisors either shaU . . . ap-
prove and confirm said decision, whereupon the permit as 
applied for may issue; or shaU refuse to approve and con-
firm su.ch decision. . . ." (Italics added.) 
Section 20 states that "Use permits may be issued for 
any of the following: 
"1. Any of the uses or purposes for which such permits 
are required or permitted by the provisions of this ordi-
nance. 
"Such use permits shall be issued under the same proce-
dure as that specified in Section 19 . . . for the granting 
of adjustments or Yariances, except that: . . . 2. The find-
ings of the Planning Commission, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, need include only that the establish-
ment, maintenance or conducting of the use for which a use 
permit is sought will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety, morals, 
comfort, convenience, or welfare of persons residing or 
working in the neighborhood of such use and will not, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, be detri-
mental to the public welfare or injurious to property or 
improvements in said neighborhood. 
" ... All other provisions of said Section 19, including 
the designation by the Planning Commission of any con-
ditions upon which the use permit may be issued and guar-
antees that such conditions will be complied with, shall 
apply to the granting of a use permit." 
Sections 9 and 10 of the State Planning Act (Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 5211b), which act concededly is controlling 
over the local Marin County ordinance, provide as follows: 
" § 9. The legislative body [of a city or county] is au-
thorized and empowered . . . to change or add to the mas-
ter plan or any part thereof . . . or to change or add to the 
official plan or any part thereof. The legislative body shall 
first refer the proposed change or addition to the planning 
commission for a report thereon. [Public hearings are then 
requirpd.] ... Proceedings for any change in ... the 
) 
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master plan or any official plan, or any part thereof, may also 
be initiated by the planning commission. 
II § 10. The body creating such planning commission may, 
by general or special rule, provide for the reference of any 
other matter or class of matters to the planning commis-
sion before final action thereon by the public body or 
officer of said city, county, or city and county, having final 
authority thereon, with the provision that final action there-
on shall not be taken until said planning commission has 
submitted its report thereon or has had reasonable time, to 
be fixed in said rule, to submit the report. . . ." 
In support of its position that the board of supervisors 
cannot lawfully issue a use permit against the adverse 
recommendation of the planning commission, the majority 
opinion, as previously indicated, relies upon those portions 
of section 19 of Ordinance 264 which state that "No permit 
shall be issued . . . unless and until a decision of the Plan-
ning Commission, . . . approving the same, is approved and 
confirmed by the Board of Supervisors. . . . Upon receipt 
of such report [of the decision of the commission], if the 
decision of the Planning Commission approved the grant-
ing of the application, the Board of Supervisors either 
shall . . . approve and confirm said decision, whereupori-
the permit as applied for may issue; or shall refuse to ap-
prove and confirm such decision." For the reasons here-
inafter stated I am convinced that, properly construed, the 
quoted provisions of section 19, as adopted into section 20, 
grant to the planning commission only the limited power 
to consider the merit or lack thereof of each application 
for a use permit and to transmit to the board of supervisors 
the opinion of the commission thereon; in other words, the 
commission is to act as an advisory body but is to have no 
power, under the terms of the ordinance, to issue a final 
decision either for or against a permit. 
By the provisions of section 9 of the State Planning Act 
quoted hereinabove, power to "change or add to the mas-
ter plan or any part thereof . . . or to change or add to the 
official plan or any part thereof" is expressly placed in the 
legislative bodies of local governmental units-in this in-
stance the Board of Supervisors of Marin County-subject 
only to the requirement that the matter first be referred to 
the planning commission for a report and that public hear-
ings be had, and by section 10 it is provided that •• The 
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body creating such planning commission may. provide 
for the reference of any other matter or class of matters 
to the planning commission before final action thereon by 
the public body or officer ... having final authority 
thereon, with the provision that final action thereon shall 
not be taken until said planning commission has submitted 
its report thereon or has had reasonable time . . . to submit 
the report. . . ." Whether the granting of a nonconform-
ing use permit be regarded on the one hand as falling under 
the "change ... to the master plan or ... to the of-
ficial plan" as described in section 9, or on the other hand 
as being one of the "other . . . class of matters" mentioned 
in section 10, the statute unequivocally contemplates that the 
ultimate decision is in the hands of the local legislative 
body. No provision is made that the report of the planning 
commission shall carry any other or greater weight than 
that which the legislative body may wish to bestow on it. 
Nor, I am convinced, was it the intent of the board of 
supervisors in adopting Ordinance 264 to irrevocably dele-
gate a controlling power to the planning commission, or 
otherwise to so limit the authority primarily vested in the 
board as to render them powerless to grant a nonconform-
ing use permit without prior approvlirof -the-commission. 
Section 19, which treats of adjustments, variances and 
appeals, and which is to be followed generally in the applica-
tion for and issuance of use permits under section 20, carries 
an introductory sentence which, as quoted hereinabove, states 
that "The Planning Commission, subject to the approval and 
confirmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case, as here-
inafter provided, shall have power. . . ." (Italics added.) 
It is to be noted that this section contains the delegation of 
only a limited power to the commission and that such power is 
expressly declared to be "subject to the approval and con-
firmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case. " Follow-
ing the qualified grant there appear procedural and other 
provisions to be followed by the commission before its decision 
and report to the board is made. The subsequent statements, 
so heavily relied upon by the majority .opinion, that "No 
permit shall be issued under the provisions of this section 
unless and until a decision of the Planning Commission, as 
aforesaid, approving the same, is approved and confirmed by 
the Board of Supervisors .... [I]f the decision of the Plan-
ning Commission approved the granting of the application, 
/ 
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the Board of Supervisors either shall . . . approve and con-
firm said decision, whereupon the permit as applied for may 
issue; or shall refuse to approve and confirm such deci-
sion. . . .," would seem to be, and it is my view that they 
are, inserted as an explicit recognition of the limitation upon 
the power of the planning commission and not as creating a 
controlling delegation of, or limitation upon, the ultimate 
power of the board of supervisors. The section, of course, 
contains no grant of power to the board of supervisors because-
all power not granted or delegated is reposed by the basic 
state law in the board. mtimate disposition of the matters 
dealt with in the sections in question (§§ 19, 20) would, at 
least normally, be a function of the board. No provision ap-
pears in any portion of the ordinance which expressly declares 
that the board shall be bound by a report of the planning 
commission adverse to the granting of a nonconforming use 
permit, and certainly in accord with accepted legal principles 
such a restriction should not be added by judicial interpola-
tion. 
The majority opinion relies upon Magruder v. City of Red-
wood (1928), 203 Cal. 665, 675 [265 P. 806] ; and Hopkins 
v. MacCulloch (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 452 [95 P.2d 950] 
(see also Schofield v. City of Los An.geles (1932), 120 Cal. 
App. 240, 245-246 [7 P.2d 1076]) as authority for the prop-
osition that a board of supervisors is bound by county ordi-
nances. I discover nothing in any of these cases which should 
affect the decision here. In the Magruder case it was held 
that a city board of trustees which granted a permit to con-
struct a building that was subsequently used for a purpose 
in violation of a zoning ordinance did not thereby place 
themselves "in a position that prevented them from thereafter 
enjorcing the terms of the ordinance." (P. 674 of 203 Cal.) 
In Hopkins v. MacCulloch (1939), supra, 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 
452, the city council of Newport Beach was held to be without 
power to grant a nonconforming use permit by a vote of only 
four of its five members, inasmuch as a city ordinance re-
quired the "full, affirmative vote of all members thereof." 
No such provision is contained in Ordinance No. 264 of 
Marin County, nor are analogous requirements set forth. 
And contrary to the position taken by the majority opinion 
it is noted that those provisions in the Newport Beach 
ordinance which dealt with consideration by the planning 
commission of nonconforming use permits were held (at 
/ 
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p. 450 of 35 Cal.App.2d) not to be "a delegation of power 
or authority of the city council to the planning commis-
sion. " Furthermore, the court there expressly observed 
that "From an interpretation of ... section 10 [of the 
planning act) ... when construed with the ordinance 
adopted in pursuance thereof, it appears to us that the 
planning commission created by the ordinance was more or 
less an advisory body only, and its powers must be limited 
to its consideration of applications for permits, and to 
recommendations for or against the allowance of the permit. 
The commission is authorized by the ordinance to hold pub-
lic hearings on any such application after publication of 
notice of hearing, to the end that property owners may 
have an opportunity to object to the granting of the permit 
on the ground that detriment or injury may result to the 
neighborhood. " The same may be appropriately said in 
respect to Marin County Ordinance 264. 
If there still can remain any doubt as to the proper con-
struction of the oT.linance in question it is resolved by the 
fact that in this case we have for our guidance not only the 
language of the enactment and the considerations which 
have becn mentioned but also evidence establishing the con-
struction placed upon the ordinance as to the precise point 
now in dispute by the very legislative body which enacted 
it. The ordinance was adopted in 1938. The record shows, 
with no dispute, "That with no exception, the Minutes of 
the Board of Supervisors show that from August 3rd, 1938, 
the date of the passage of said Marin County Planning 
Ordinance No. 264, to date, the Marin County Board of 
Supervisors has held hearings upon recommendations of 
the Marin County Plallning Commission whether the ... 
Commission recommenued approval or denial of the said 
applications for Use Permits, Adjustment Permits or Var-
iance Permits; 
•• That . . . The Minutes of the Board of Supervisors 
show specific instances in which the . . . Planning Com-
mission presented to the Board of Supervisors their recom-
mcndations denying applications for Adjustment Permits 
and Use Permits, whereupon the ... Supervisors held a 
hearing, reviewed the recommendation of t.he ... Planning 
Commission and either approved the recommendation cleny-
ing said application or reversed the recommendation of the 
/ 
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Planning Commission and granted the application for a 
Use Permit or an Adjustment ... 
,. That ... the Marin County Board of Supervisors con-
sistently and with no exception, interpreted Section 19 of 
... Ordinance #264 as never having divested them of the 
power to overrule the recommendations of the . . . Plan-
ning Commission . . . whether said . . . Planning Commis-
sion recommended that said Use Permit be denied or 
granted. " 
The record contains certified copies of excerpts from 
minutes of meetings of the board of supervisors showing 
that on 16 different applications (previous to the one in 
this case, which is number 17), at meetings held on Novem-
ber 14, 1938, April 10, 1939, November 25, 1940, February 
24, 1941, May 26, 1941, October 14, 1941, April 6, 1942, 
September 14, 1942, November 9, 1942. November 23, 1942, 
April 7, 1943, July 26, 1943, November 8, 1943, November 
22, 1943 (two applications), and November 13, 1944, the 
board evidenced its construction of the ordinance by pro-
ceeding to hear, consider and pass on applications for use 
permits or adjustments notwithstanding denial recommenda-
tions by the planning commission. There is no suggestion 
that the record is incomplete or that in any instance, from the 
enactment of the ordinance to the date of this action, the 
board deviated from its construction of the ordinance. Thus, . 
in every case wherein the point was involved, the legislative 
body which drafted and adopted the ordinance construed it 
as giving the plannin6! commission investigative and ad-
visory powers only and as leaving in the board the juris-
diction which they exercised. 
The majority opinion mentions two instances, other than 
in the matter before us, in which the board granted an ad-
justment or use permit "despite the commission's denial of 
the application"; it wholly ignores the 14 othcr instances in 
which the board just as clearly evidenced the same construc-
tion by considering and passing on the commission's rec-
ommendation for denial. The evidence of construction is 
equally clear whether the planning commission's recom-
mendation for denial was disapproved or approved. If the I 
majority opinion is correct, the action of the planning com-
mission recommending denial was not a mere advisory rec-
ommendation, it was a final denial and there was nothing for 
the board to act on. Yet in every instance it did considel 
1 
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the application and the planning commission's recommenda-
tion and did take final action for the granting ()r denial of 
the application. 
This court has repeatedly stated that the construction of 
8 statute by the officials charged with its administration must 
be given great weight. (Nelson v. Dean (1946), 27 Cal.2d 
873, 880 [168 P.2d 16] ; Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California 
Entp. Com. (1944), 24 Cal;2d 753, 756 [151 P.2d 233, 155 
A.L.R. 405]; Co-unty of Los Angeles v. Prisbie (1942), 19 
Cal.2d 634, 643 [122 P.2d 526J ; Los Angdes County v. Su-
perior Court (1941),17 Cal.2d 707,712 [112 P.2d 10J ; Riley 
v. Thompson (1924), 193 Cal. 773, 778 [227 P. 772].) Here 
we have contemporaneous and administrative construction 
by the very body which enacted the ordinance and such con-
struction has been uniform and unwavering and repeatedly 
aeted upon and unequivocally evidenced in a series of pro-
ceedings beginning within a few mouths of adoption of the 
ordinance and running down to the date of the consistent 
action in the matter now before us. My attention has never 
been called to a case wherein the elements demanding respect 
for contemporaneous and administrative construction are 
greater. -- -__________ . _ . 
So far as concerns that portion of the injunction order 
appealed fro1p._ which restrains the board of supervisors from 
proceeding with the adoption of the ordinance to regulate 
reduction plants, it is only when such a board is acting in 
excess of its jurisdiction that its legislative actions may be -
interfered with by the courts. (See Glide v. Superior Court 
(1905), 147 Cal. 21, 25 [81 P. 225] ; Muchenberger v. City 
of Santa Monica (1929), 206 Cal. 635, 646 [275 P. 803]; 
Reclamation District v. Superior Court (1916), 171 Cal. 672, 
681-682 [154 P. 845] ; cf. Brock v. Superior Court (1938),11 
Cal.2d 682 [81 P.2d 931]; McKay Jewelers v. Bowron 
(1942),19 Ca1.2d 595, 599 [122 P.2d 543, 139 A.L.R. 1188].) 
Inasmuch as thp. Legislature has by the State Planning Act 
placed in the Board of Supervisors of Marin County final 
authority to act on zoning matters in that county, it is appar-
ent that the adoption of regulatory ordinances falls within 
such authority. The conditions to be designated by the 
planning commission pursuant to sections 19 and 20 of Ordi-
nance 264, should it recommend to the board the granting 
of a variance, adjustment, or nonconforming use permit are, 
as are' the other recommendations of the commission, advisory 
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only, and deprive the board of none of its ultimate power. 
Consequently the court below erred in enjoining further 
proceedings to complete the enactment of the disputed 
ordinance. 
And until such an ordinance were adopted and in effect 
and appellant Alioto's reduction plant were operating under 
its terms, it is difficult to perceive upon what basis the trial 
court could conclude, as would be necessary to sustain the 
injunction, that, as plaintiff-respondent attempts to plead in -
his complaint (and as denied in Alioto's answer), such plant 
would constitute a nuisance in fact. The parties argue the 
point whether a reduction plant operating under a regulatory 
ordinance and pursuant to a use permit could . lawfully be 
deemed a nuisance in any event (see Civ. Code, § 3482; N or-
ton v.Oity of Pomona (1935),5 Cal.2d 54,59 [53 P.2d 952]; 
Eaton v. Klimm (1933), 217 Cal. 362, 370 [18 P.2d 678]). 
However, in view of the fact that the proposed plant would 
be constructed and operated in a district already zoned for 
heavy industry, in view of the further fact that the proposed 
ordinance does not purport to authorize, and does purport to 
forbid, conditions which might amount to a nuisance, and 
because other material conditions under which the plaut 
would operate cannot be determined at this date, the trial 
court does not appear to have been in a position to properly 
determine that the plant would constitute a nuisance if and 
when operating. 
Plaintiff-respondent '. argument that the actions of the 
board with respect to both the use permit and the ordinance 
were void by reason of the fact that Supervisor Thompson, 
who cast one of the three original affirmative votes, is tJ.Je 
husband of one of appellant Alioto's attorneys is based upon 
contentions that the board in hearing and passing upon an 
application for a nonconforming use permit is acting in ft 
judicial, or at least quasijudicial, capacity; that the grauting 
of such a permit "appears to be a right in the nature of a 
grant or franchise" and therefore is a contract; that because 
sections 168 and 1 il of the Civil Code make a wife's earnings 
after marriage liable for necessities of life contracted for by 
her husband despite a gift to her from him (as was here made 
by Supervisor Thompson to his wife) of his interest in buch 
earnings, Supervisor Thompson was necessarily interested 
in assisting his wife to successfully represent Alioto and thus, 
presumably, to earn a larger fee for her services; and that 
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therefore Supervisor Thompson was by reason of public 
policy as expressed in various court decisions and of statutory 
law as set forth in section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
and section 1090 of the Government Code disqualified from 
acting in either a quasijudicial capacity or in the making of 
a contract by the board of supervisors. 
I find no occasion to pass on the question of the asserted 
disquali:fication of Mr. Thompson. Such question has become 
entirely moot. Since the appeal was taken Mr. Thompson 
has ceased to be a member of the board of supervisors. im-
mediately following the vote on the application for the non-
conforming use permit and again following that on the pro-
posed ordinance, one of the supervisors who had voted against 
both measures gave notice that, under parliamentary rules 
of order, he elected to change his vote to the affirmative and 
moved for reconsideration of the questions at the next meet-
ing of the board of supervisors. The board then adjourned 
to meet again on March 12, 1945, and two days prior to that 
date (on March 10, 1945) plaintiff filed his complaint herein. 
The status of the application is, therefore, that of a pending 
matter before the board of which Mr. Thompson is not a 
member. The legal question as to whether Mr. Thompson was 
'quali:fied or disql~alified in r~spect to participation in the 
original vote does not appear to have any possible effect upon 
the validity of the proceedings which must ensue upon the 
going down of the remittitur. The motion for reconsideration 
will be acted upon by a board of which Mr. Thompson is not 
a member and its action will control. 
For the reasons above set forth, I would reverse all portions 
of the order appealed from. 
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
29, 1947. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
